Re: [tlug] Somewhat OT- open source software for US voting machines

[Edward Middleton <emiddleton@example.com>]

Ian Wells wrote:
> 2008/10/6 Edward Middleton <emiddleton@example.com>:
>   
>> So Edison solved a problem that no-one else thought was a problem.
>> After the last US election there is no question that there is a problem.
>>  Whether e-voting is the solution is debatable.
>>     
>
> I presume you're talking about the last-but-one, replete with hanging
> chads.  Thus the question remains, why do Americans find it too
> difficult to put an 'X' in a box next to a name?  (Or would we be
> wondering if a '/' meant that they thought about the candidate but
> changed their mind at the last moment?)
>
> Technology can't be the solution if there is no problem.
>   

I guess the fact that you can cast an invalid vote is a flaw in the
system, and even Bruce Schneier[1] is on record suggesting this is one
area were e-voting systems make a lot of sense.


None of this means that we should abandon touch-screen voting; the
benefits of DRE[2] machines are too great to throw away. But it does
mean that we need to recognize its limitations, and design systems that
can be accurate despite them.

   1. DRE machines must have a voter-verifiable paper audit trails
      (sometimes called a voter-verified paper ballot). This is a paper
      ballot printed out by the voting machine, which the voter is
      allowed to look at and verify. He doesn’t take it home with him.
      Either he looks at it on the machine behind a glass screen, or he
      takes the paper and puts it into a ballot box. The point of this
      is twofold. One, it allows the voter to confirm that his vote was
      recorded in the manner he intended. And two, it provides the
      mechanism for a recount if there are problems with the machine.
   2. Software used on DRE machines must be open to public scrutiny.
      This also has two functions. One, it allows any interested party
      to examine the software and find bugs, which can then be
      corrected. This public analysis improves security. And two, it
      increases public confidence in the voting process. If the software
      is public, no one can insinuate that the voting system has
      unfairness built into the code. (Companies that make these
      machines regularly argue that they need to keep their software
      secret for security reasons. Don’t believe them. In this instance,
      secrecy has nothing to do with security.)



Edward

1. http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0404.html#4
2. Direct Recording Electronic voting machines DRE